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Measuring the Performance of Hedge Funds  
Using Two-stage Peer Group Benchmarks 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper is the first to present a two-stage peer group benchmarking approach to 
evaluate the performance of hedge funds. We present different ways of orthogonalizing 
the peer group benchmark and discuss their properties in general. We propose to or-
thogonalize the benchmark against all other exogenous factors. For a broad dataset we 
show that this approach captures much more commonalities in hedge funds returns 
compared to the standard methodology if only classical exogenous factors are used. As 
a result the empirical rankings of hedge funds on the basis of alphas received by this 
new approach change heavily. Therefore, the proposed two-stage peer group benchmark 
allows us to better determine which hedge fund managers outperformed the others in the 
past. 
Keywords:  Hedge Funds, Performance Measurement, Factor Model, Peer Group 
Benchmark 
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1 Introduction 
Since 63 years ago when Alfred Winslow Jones founded the first hedge fund in 1949, 
this investment vehicle has attracted much attention from both academics and the gen-
eral investment community. The rising interest in hedge funds industry might be a direct 
consequence of some prominent incidents, such as the successful bets of Soros’ Quan-
tum Fund against the British pound in 1999, however, later the collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management in 2000, and also the multi-billion dollar profits of Paulson & 
Company during the recent financial crisis (see report on New York Times, 2011). In 
recent years, the hedge funds sector has attracted some major institutional investors, 
such as pension funds, insurance companies and University endowments. There are ap-
proximately 21,999 active hedge funds globally by 2010 with 14,000 of them single 
strategy ones and 7,000 fund of hedge funds and the asset under management is about 
$2.7 trillion (Brown, 2013).  
Most of empirical studies measure the past performance of hedge funds using different 
kinds of multi-factor models. The estimated alpha then represents the excess risk ad-
justed returns of hedge funds. Though the multi-factor model has been the dominant 
approach applied in asset pricing literature, it has significant difficulties when adopted 
in hedge funds performance measurement.   
Firstly, as hedge funds invest across a huge variety of asset classes and their positions 
are usually leveraged, the dynamics of risk-return payoff in hedge funds differ from 
traditional investment vehicles. Some researchers have argued that the hedge fund risk-
return payoffs are nonlinear; in particular, the equity-oriented hedge fund strategies ex-
hibit a put option-like payoff (Fung and Hsieh 2001, Mitchell and Pulvino 2001, and 
Agarwal and Naik 2004). Secondly, due to their dynamic trading strategies, hedge funds 
potentially contain certain systematic risks that are not observable. Though the risk fac-
tor model has been developed from single market-factor model, to Fama-French three-
factor, and to Carhart four-factor model, and to more recent Fung and Hsieh seven-
factor model, the search for additional risk factor in hedge funds investment can never 
end due to the wide range of investments and investment strategies by hedge funds. 
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Thus the linear-factor model with standard asset benchmarks will not be sufficient to 
capture the risk-return relationship of hedge funds.   
Additionally, though some studies have agreed that in general the hedge funds outper-
form the mutual funds, it is not clear how funds should be ranked relatively. Empiri-
cally, while many hedge funds employ similar strategies, the residuals produced from 
standard factor models are correlated with each other. This “commonality” problem 
within hedge funds strategies makes it difficult to assess the performance of individual 
funds. That is, it is hard to distinguish whether the superior performance of a fund is a 
result of individual manager’s unique skills or just an average reflection of particular 
investment strategies.  
In this regards we introduce a concept of two-stage peer group benchmark for hedge 
funds to improve their performance measurement. We propose that the individual hedge 
funds performance should be measured not only against the common risk factors but 
also against a peer group benchmark. The most intuitive peer group is the strategy group 
identified by funds themselves. Thus we augment the approach of Hunter et al. (2013) 
to derive both main strategy and sub-strategy peer group benchmark and combine them 
with our selected common risk factors. Furthermore, we orthogonalize the respective 
benchmarks (main-strategy and sub-strategy) separately for every fund in our sample 
with respect to the life time of the funds. By doing this we get more precise results as 
we eliminate distortions which otherwise would be caused by the variation of correla-
tions between exogenous and peer group benchmarks over the total sample period. 
Our study finds that employment of a two-stage orthogonal peer group benchmark facil-
itates a more parsimonious and in-depth identification of superior hedge funds. Our 
findings indicate that two-stage peer group benchmarks should be implemented in ex-
amining the individual hedge funds performance. The benchmarks should be orthogo-
nalized against all exogenous factors in a common risk factor model. However, the form 
of orthogonalization affects the rankings of the hedge funds studied at the sub-group 
level. In particular, the orthogonalization ‘without alphas’ option only ranks the funds 
with reference to the exogenous factors considered, whereas the orthogonalization ‘with 
alphas’ option ranks the funds with reference to both the peer group benchmarks and 
 5 
 
exogenous factors. Thus, depends on the examiner’s need, a proper form of orthogo-
nalization needs to be chosen when the peer group benchmark is adopted. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 de-
scribes our research design. Section 4 contains information about the data and the em-
pirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature review 
There is an extensive literature on hedge funds performance. Most of earlier literature 
suggests that hedge funds perform better than mutual funds in regards to delivering a 
positive risk-adjusted return, measured by alpha. Liang (1999) claims that compare to 
mutual funds, hedge funds offer better risk-return trade-offs, in particular, higher Share 
ratio, lower market risk and higher abnormal returns from 1994 to 1996. Thus, hedge 
funds provide a more efficient investment opportunity set for investors. Similarly, Ac-
kerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) find that hedge funds outperform mutual 
funds from 1988-1995 and the average Sharpe ratio of hedge funds was higher than that 
of mutual funds, but not standard market indices. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
(1999) examine the performance of the off-share hedge fund over the period of 1989 to 
1995. Their results also show that there where positive risk-adjusted returns despite the 
fact that hedge funds had high attrition rates and low covariation with the US stock 
market. However, they found little evidence of differential manager skill. Capocci, Cor-
hay and Hübner (2005) show that due to high adaptability and active investment behav-
iour, most hedge funds in their databases significantly outperformed the market during 
their sample period, especially during the bullish period. The performance persists dur-
ing the bullish period as well. Other studies supporting the outperformance of hedge 
funds include Fung and Hsieh (2011), Chincarini (2010) and Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu 
(2010). 
Another stream of research however questions the performances of hedge funds by ad-
dressing some “hidden” risk factors by previous work, such as volatility, capital flows 
and liquidity. Liang (2001) study hedge fund performance and risk from 1990 to 1999. 
His results show that hedge funds returned 14.2% annually compared to 18.8% of the 
S&P 500 index. However, the S&P 500 index is more volatile than hedge funds. 
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Yu and Dichev (2011) argue that the returns of hedge fund investors are not as good as 
previously documented when taking into consideration of the capital flows in and out of 
the funds. Using a measure of dollar-weighted returns they find that the hedge fund re-
turns are 3 to 7 percent lower than the corresponding buy-and-hold strategy. Using fac-
tor models of risk and estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, they find that the 
real alphas of hedge funds are close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns 
are lower than the return on S&P 500 index and are only marginal higher than the risk-
free rate. The result of Yu and Dichev (2011) is consistent with earlier work of Baquero 
and Verbeek (2009) and Fung et al. (2008). 
More recently literature concerns the missing factors from earlier work, and one of them 
is the liquidity risk of hedge funds. Aragon (2007) examines the relationship of hedge 
fund returns and share restrictions imposed by funds. His study finds that the excess 
returns of funds with lockup restrictions are approximately 4-7% per year higher than 
those of non-lock up funds. The average alpha of all funds is negative or insignificant 
after controlling for lockups and other share restrictions. Sadka (2010) claims that funds 
load on liquidity risk subsequently outperform low-loading funds by about 6% annually 
from 1994 to 2008.  
Besides the liquidity is considered as an additional risk factor, the search for external 
risk factors seems to continue as there are other factors being discovered which influ-
ence the hedge fund performance, such as the managerial skills and macroeconomic 
variables (Avramov, et al. 2011). Though many research works have been devoted to 
study the performance of hedge funds relative to other asset classes, the relative per-
formance of individual funds are less studied. Some empirical studies such as Koso-
waski, Naik and Teo (2007), find that the top hedge funds performance is not by luck. 
Performance persists at annual horizons; in particular, performance persistence is 
stronger within certain strategies. The performance persistence of funds might imply the 
possible unique skills among certain group of fund managers. To further identify man-
agers’ skills, Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) developed a statistical model 
to relate the fund performance to its decision to liquidate or close in order to infer the 
performance of a hedge fund that left the database. They also confirmed that there is 
significant performance persistence among superior funds. 
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 In general, the literature agrees that trading strategies of HFs differ from traditional 
investment vehicles, such as mutual funds. The distinct features of hedge funds make 
the performance measurement a challenging task.  Though earlier literature claims that 
hedge funds were able to deliver a positive significant excess return, measured by alpha, 
the conventional multi-risk factor model with the standard asset benchmarks appear to 
be weak, especially in assisting identification of superior funds at individual level.  
3 Research design 
3.1 Introducing Two-stage Peer Group Benchmark 
The standard multi-factor models employed in performances measurement utilize exog-
enously determined risk factors. They explain a significant part of the variance of hedge 
fund returns. However, hedge funds invest in a variety of asset classes. The private na-
ture and a diversity of strategies that hedge fund managers employ impede the detection 
of further exogenous factors which significantly influence fund performance. These 
hedge fund specific strategies introduce fund specific risk factors which are difficult to 
proxy and hence are left unaccounted for in the extant performance management studies 
to date. 
The basic idea of using peer group factor for performance measurement is not new. The 
essence of the idea is to evaluate the “relative” performance of the fund managers to 
his/her peer groups. The  spirit of peer evaluation has been adopted by Elton, Gruber 
and Blake (1997) and Cohen, Coval and Pástor (2005) in assessing mutual funds per-
formance and a more recent work in hedge funds by Jagannathan, Malakhov and 
Novikov (2010). Hunter et al. (2013) is the first to explicitly using the term of “peer 
group benchmark”. It is based on the idea that performance measurement does not nec-
essarily require the exact identification of all influencing exogenous factors. In fact, 
taking advantage of the information by groupings or classifications of mutual funds nat-
urally leads an explanatory proxy, which is called the peer group benchmark. 
The incorporation of peer group benchmarks has a few advantages in better measuring 
and identifying the top performing funds or the fund managers. First of all, even if an 
exemplary examiner was able to identify additional explanatory risk factors for single 
funds or fund classes, he/she still has to assume that these assets underlie other “hidden” 
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factors. If these unidentified factors significantly influence the returns of several indi-
vidual funds within one group, they consequently influence the performance of the 
group as a whole.  
Secondly, investors are able to diversify their wealth by investing in various assets. 
Even if they aim for one certain investment strategy, they still can disperse their money 
over many different funds pursuing this strategy. By promising a superior performance 
fund managers naturally compete with returns that can be gained by pursuing diversi-
fied investments in other funds of the same strategy. Hence, individual managers im-
plicitly compete within the peer group of their strategy. 
Additionally, fund managers within the same category of funds apply similar models, 
behave similarly and invest capital in the same asset categories. Thus, a high correlation 
between the residuals from regression of single fund returns to market returns is usually 
expected. Further benchmarking the individual funds again its peer group will reduce 
the high correlation of residuals. 
Thus, the peer group benchmark approach proposed by Hunter et al. (2013) for mutual 
funds represents an even more promising approach to solve the “missing variables” 
problem in risk factor identification as well as the “commonality” problem in assessing 
individual hedge fund’s performance. However, the Hunter et al. (2013) approach is not 
directly applicable in hedge funds study due to the distinct difference in nature of hedge 
funds and mutual funds.  
Hunter et al. (2013) requires the knowledge of the investment objectives of all consid-
ered funds which is quite straightforward in the case of mutual funds. The actual alloca-
tion is done by the fund managers themselves who, by choosing a strategy or investment 
objective, determine their own benchmark. A huge advantage of this method is that it 
does not require a deep understanding of underlying factors – it is sufficient to know 
that such unidentified influences exist which affect the performance of individual strat-
egies to varying degrees. 
However, there are some problems when applying this method to hedge funds. In con-
trast to mutual funds which can be categorized very precisely due to restrict regulatory 
requirement, hedge funds are not obligated to disclose the details of their investment 
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activity. In addition, as the definitions of many strategies are imprecise and inconsistent 
the allocation of individual funds into an aggregated strategy group is less obvious. Fur-
thermore, it is common for hedge fund managers to conceal their strategies or, to pursue 
several different strategies at the same time (Fung and Hsieh, 1997; Mader, 2008; Fung 
and Hsieh, 2002). Thus, categorize each hedge funds into a strategy group is a more 
complicated case. 
In order to cope with these problems, we extend the approach of Hunter et al. (2013) by 
using a two-stage peer group benchmark regression. We compute peer group bench-
marks for all hedge funds main- and sub-strategies in our sample which allows us to 
benchmark single funds against a relatively homogenous group. This design helps us to 
add explanatory power to our model in particular with respect to the funds which cannot 
be allocated directly or which were categorized wrongly. 
In addition to equally-weighted peer group benchmarks, we also consider using value-
weighted peer group benchmarks. Since size has been identified as an important factor 
in hedge funds’ performance (see Gregorious and Rouah, 2002), computing the value-
weighted benchmark is able to serve as a robustness test here. 
For creating equally-weighted peer group benchmarks we consider all funds included in 
our sample. The computing process for calculating the peer group benchmarks for the 
main- and sub-strategies is based on 
ܧܤௌ௧௥௔௧௘௪ ௧ ൌ
∑ ሺݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ሻ௡௜ୀଵ
݊ௌ௧௥௔௧,௧  (1) 
with ܧܤௌ௧௥௔௧௘௪ ௧ representing the equally-weighted peer group benchmark as the excess 
return of all funds belonging to the respective main- or sub-strategy Strat in month t, ݎ௜௧ 
represents the return of the hedge fund i which is allocated to strategy Strat and ݎ௙௧ rep-
resents the risk-free rate in month t. ݊ௌ௧௥௔௧,௧stands for the number of all funds which 
belong to Strat in t. 
The value-weighted peer group benchmark is computed similarly. However, here we do 
not consider all funds in our sample. If the sample does not contain any information 
about the capitalization of certain hedge funds, they are not incorporated in our value-
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weighted peer group benchmark. If the data is incomplete, we compute the missing val-
ues for the assets under management (AuM) by interpolation.  
ܧܤௌ௧௥௔௧௩௪ ௧ ൌ  
∑ ሺݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ሻ௡௜ୀଵ ܣݑܯ௜೟
∑ ܣݑܯ௜೟௡௜ୀଵ
 (2) 
ܧܤௌ௧௥௔௧௩௪ ௧ in Equation (2) represents the value-weighted peer group benchmark as the 
value-weighted monthly excess return of the main- or sub-strategy Strat. For each 
month t, we multiply the monthly excess returns ݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ of hedge fund i, allocated to 
the group Strat, by the value of its own assets under management (ܣݑܯ௜೟). Then we 
divide the sum of all value-weighted returns in t by the sum of all ܣݑܯ of the respec-
tive main- or sub-strategy in t. 
 
3.2 Base factor model 
The standard multifactor model serves as our base model which utilizes the three Fama-
French Factors, namely the Market Factor (MMRF), the Small Minus Big Factor (SMB) 
and the High Minus Low Factor (HML) supplemented by Carhart’s (1997) Momentum 
Factor (MOM). As our US-sample contains hedge funds which are actively investing in 
domestic as well as international markets (including emerging markets) we augment our 
model in line with Agarwal and Naik (2004) to include more risk factors. The first addi-
tional factor is the return of MSCI Emerging Markets Index (EMI). However, since this 
index exhibits high correlations with the market factor MMRF, we orthogonalize this 
factor with regard to MMRF. We use the superscript factor0 to indicate the 
orthogonalization of a factor against all others, here EMIO. 
Additionally we integrate the return of Lehman (now Barclays) High Yield Index (HYI) 
into our model which allows better explanations of returns gained by fixed income 
strategies. As this factor exhibits no significant correlations with other benchmarks, we 
do not orthogonalize this factor. 
One problem with hedge funds performance evaluation is to deal with the nonlinear 
factors. An effective measure for extending the benchmark portfolio from linear to non-
linear is to integrate the orthogonalized returns from call and put options (CallO and 
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PutO) on market factors (Amin and Kat, 2003). This approach was firstly applied by 
Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) based on earlier work of Merton (1981) and Connor 
and Korajczyk (1986). By applying this approach to hedge funds, Fung and Hsieh 
(2001b) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) show that there is a relation between hedge 
fund strategies and option payoffs. However, Agarwal and Naik (2004) discover that the 
explanatory power of option return is not limited to these strategies. They show that 
improvements in performance measurement can be achieved for many hedge fund strat-
egies.  
Building on previous research, we use the following equation as our base model: 
ݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ ൌ  ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜,ெெோிܯܯܴܨ௧ ൅ ߚ௜,ௌெ஻ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚ௜,ுெ௅ܪܯܮ௧
൅ ߚ௜,ெைெܯܱܯ௧ ൅ ߚ௜,ாெூܧܯܫ௧௢ ൅ ߚ௜,ு௒ூܪܻܫ௧
൅ ߚ௜,஼௔௟௟ܥ݈݈ܽ௧௢ ൅ ߚ௜,௉௨௧ܲݑݐ௧௢  ൅ ߳௜௧ 
 
(3) 
with ݎ௜௧ representing the return of hedge fund ݅ in month ݐ and ݎ௙௧ representing the risk 
free rate at time ݐ. ܯܯܴܨ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, ܪܯܮ௧, ܯܱܯ௧, ܧܯܫ௧௢, ܪܻܫ௧, ܥ݈݈ܽ௧௢ and ܲݑݐ௧௢ represent 
the exogenous risk factors for the corresponding month ݐ. In the following, exogenous 
factors will be referred to as standard factors ܵܨ௧,௫ with ݔ representing the respective 
consecutively numbered factor. The intercept ߙ௜ and the residual ߳௜௧ represent the output 
parameters of the regression. Additionally, the regression yields a beta ߚ௜,௫ for every 
risk factor ݔ and every fund ݅. 
For simplicity Equation (3) will be expressed as: 
ݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ ൌ  ߙ௜ ൅ ෍ ߚ௜,௫ܵܨ௧,௫
଼
௫ୀଵ
൅ ߳௜௧ 
 
(4) 
 
3.3 Models with orthogonalized peer group benchmarks 
We introduce the peer group benchmark as an additional explanatory factor. The peer 
group benchmarks are formed from the same sample set and augmented into our stand-
ard multi-factor model to capture otherwise non-explained variances, and depending on 
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the concrete form of the peer group benchmark, to adjust the alphas measured. To make 
sure that the peer group benchmarks do not distort the coefficients estimated from our 
base model, the peer group benchmarks can be orthogonalized against all exogenous 
factors. As we do not want to pre-justify which orthogonalization approach will yield 
the most meaningful results, we consider two different approaches. 
We begin with the orthogonalization of the equally- and value-weighted peer group 
benchmarks (index ܱ applies to both equally- and value-weighted benchmarks) for the 
respective main-strategies against the exogenous factors from Equation (3). For this 
purpose we apply the following linear OLS-multi-factor regression: 
ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ை ௧ ൌ  ܽெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ை ൅ ෍ ܾெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧,௫ை ܵܨ௧,௫
଼
௫ୀଵ
൅ ݁ெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை  (5) 
From this we get the first orthogonalized peer group benchmark:  
ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧೟ ை,௔ା௘  ൌ ܽெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ை ൅ ݁ெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை  
 
(6) 
 
Hunter et al. (2013) modify this further by dropping the ܽܯܽ݅݊ݏݐݎܽݐܱ  from Equation (6). 
The second orthogonalized peer group benchmark thus obtained is: 
ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௘ ൌ ݁ெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை  
 
(7) 
 
According to Hunter et al. (2013) this approach allows better identification of manage-
ment skills. We discuss later which of these two approaches is appropriate for hedge 
funds. 
In the second stage, we additionally augment the orthogonalized peer group benchmarks 
in our factor model based on the sub-strategies. This is carried out by orthogonalizing 
the equally- and value-weighted sub-strategy benchmarks against all exogenous factors 
and the respective main-strategy benchmark. Thus we get: 
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ܧܤௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ௧ ൌ  ܽௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ൅ ෍ ܾௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧,௫ை ܵܨ௧,௫
଼
௫ୀଵ
൅  ܾௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௔ା௘ ൅ ௌ݁௨௕௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை  
(8) 
 respectively 
ܧܤௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ௧ ൌ ܽௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ൅ ෍ ܾௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧,௫ை ܵܨ௧,௫
଼
௫ୀଵ
൅  ܾௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௘ ൅ ௌ݁௨௕௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை  
(9) 
 
From this we get the results for the orthogonalized peer group sub-strategy benchmark: 
ܧܤௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧೟ ை,௔ା௘  ൌ ܽௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ை ൅ ௌ݁௨௕௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை   (10) 
respectively 
ܧܤௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௘  ൌ ௌ݁௨௕௦௧௥௔௧,௧ை     (11) 
 
Finally, we augment the orthogonalized main- and sub-strategy peer group benchmarks 
into our multi-factor-model: 
ݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ ൌ  ߙ௜ ൅ ෍ ߚ௜,௫ܵܨ௧,௫
଼
௫ୀଵ
൅ ߚ௜,ெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௔ା௘
൅  ߚ௜,ௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ ܧܤௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௔ା௘ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
(12) 
respectively  
ݎ௜௧ െ ݎ௙௧ ൌ  ߙ௜ ൅ ෍ ߚ௜,௫ܵܨ௧,௫
଼
௫ୀଵ
൅ ߚ௜,ெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ ܧܤெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௘
൅  ߚ௜,ௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ ܧܤௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧೟ை,௘ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
(13) 
with ߚ௜,ெ௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ representing the factor loading for the respective main-strategy for 
each fund ݅ and ߚ௜,ௌ௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ represents the factor loading for the respective sub-strategy 
for each fund ݅. 
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All peer group benchmarks in all variations are separately calculated for the equally- 
and value-weighted cases.  
 
3.4 Models with different forms of peer group benchmarks 
Since there is no theoretical rule as to whether and how to orthogonalize the peer group 
benchmark we first clarify the common and distinctive features of all alternative ap-
proaches. We do this on the basis of a one-stage peer group benchmark for multiple 
exogenous factors. We assume that the respective regressions are estimated using OLS 
as usual. 
There are four main Options considered: 
1. Non-inclusion of any peer group benchmark (“no EB”) 
2. Inclusion of a non-orthogonalized peer group benchmark (“EB non-ortho.”) 
3. Inclusion of an orthogonalized peer group benchmark – Use of epsilons e plus 
benchmark-alphas a (“EB = a+e”), i.e. the residuals plus intercept 
4. Inclusion of an orthogonalized peer group benchmark without the benchmark-
alphas – Use of the epsilons e only (“EB = e”), i.e. the residuals only 
It is not surprising that using no peer group benchmark at all (Option 1) and using a non 
orthogonalized peer group benchmark (Option 2) will result in different estimates for 
the alphas and betas for the exogenous factors as well as the respective test-statistics and 
the R2. Due to the inclusion of the non-orthogonalized benchmarks under Option 2, all 
common factor loadings are shifted to the peer group benchmark. Therefore the infor-
mation about how the funds perform against the exogenous factors – in other words the 
market – is not visible any more. By construction this leads to the result that the mean 
alpha and the mean betas for all exogenous factors over all funds become zero. Note 
that also the rankings of the funds on the basis of the alphas within each group can 
change. In general, adding the peer group benchmark will increase the (adjusted) R2 in 
most cases. The economic interpretation of the results of Option 2 is the performance of 
the single funds against its peer group. Assuming that not all exogenous factors are cap-
tured in the standard model this approach can be seen as to be sensible, especially when 
one is interested in choosing one fund out of the available funds within one peer group. 
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However, as the benchmark variable is correlated with the funds return, the regression is 
spurious. 
To prevent changes in factor loadings of the exogenous factors the orthogonalized peer 
group benchmark (Option 3) can be used. Now the estimated alphas including the test-
statistics are by construction the same as in Option 2. The betas for the exogenous fac-
tors are by construction the same as Option 1. Therefore the overall economic interpre-
tation of these results – especially the alphas – is analogous to Option 2. 
To obtain also the same values for the alphas as in Option 1, the orthogonalized peer 
group benchmark with residuals only (Option 4) can be used. However, the test-
statistics for the alphas changes in comparison to the other approaches. Therefore this 
approach combines the “original” alphas (from the base model) and exogenous factor 
loadings with the new peer group benchmarks, in expectation of better test-statistics for 
the coefficients as per Hunter et al. (2013) argues. Therefore this approach makes sense 
if one is interested in the performance of the hedge funds against all exogenous factors. 
To summarize, using peer group benchmarks can result in different rankings of funds 
within the peer group when using Options (2) and (3). The test-statistics improve with 
respect to Option 1 which enables us to better identify which funds out- or under-
performed the market relative to their peer group. In addition, the rankings against the 
market and other extra-market factors change when using the peer group benchmarks in 
Options (2) and (3), but is the same for Options (1) and (4). The same holds within the 
sample of hedge funds when the hedge funds are attributed to different peer group 
benchmarks. Not surprisingly, the regression results for Option 4 mimic that of Option 1 
and the regression results for Option 2 are spurious due to strong multi-collinearities 
between the exogenous and peer group regressors.  As such, we shall focus only on Op-
tions (3) and Option (4) for the rest of the paper. 
4 Data 
4.1 Hedge funds data 
Our dataset covers a 20-year period between the first of January 1990 and the second of 
January 2010 which exceeds the sample period of most previous studies. In addition, 
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this time frame covers several different market conditions, including the bull market of 
the 1990s when the S&P500 index increased from 379 to 2,002 points and where the 
total return of the S&P500 more than quintupled between January 1990 and January 
2000 and the subsequent crisis-ridden decade, characterized by the bursting of the dot-
com bubble and the global financial crisis. 
Hence, in contrast to most other studies which are restricted to the 90s and late 80s, we 
analyze the performance of hedge funds during a period of serious crisis. Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) note that the 90s do not offer a sufficiently 
varied market environment to reasonably measure hedge fund performance in different 
market phases. For evaluating hedge funds’ performance, considering periods of nega-
tive market performance is essential, since the term hedge fund implicitly assumes the 
use of hedging to minimize market risks. 
In accordance with previous studies we use monthly returns for our study. All relevant 
information, such as the funds’ monthly returns, the AuM, the currency denomination, 
as well as funds’ main- and sub-strategies, are obtained from the Life Fund and Dead 
Fund databases from Hedge Funds Research (HFR). The Life Fund only contains funds 
which report to HFR by the end of our sample period. The latter includes all funds 
which stopped reporting data to HFR before the end of our sample period either due to 
the tactical closure or liquidation. After screening the database for redundant indices 
and duplications our base sample encompasses 14,816 funds, with 4,418 identified as 
liquidated, 4,101 classified as not reporting and 6,297 classified as live. 
We further screen the data to make sure that we only consider funds reporting all of 
their returns in USD monthly. Furthermore, we only consider funds which provide de-
tailed information about the fees charged. By removing all other funds from our sample 
we obtain our benchmark sample which we used to calculate the peer group bench-
marks. Further, we also eliminate all funds which did not report more than 36 monthly 
returns to HFR, which leaves us with a study sample of 7,559 funds. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the strategy allocations in the HFR-database and the num-
ber of monthly return observations for all funds included in the study sample. 
(Insert Table 1 about here)  
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The study sample we use for our performance evaluation might embody several biases. 
The survivorship bias occurs when underperforming “dead” funds are not sufficiently 
considered in the evaluation process. With respect to the survivorship bias, previous 
studies on hedge fund performance observed a positive impact on yearly returns from 
0.16% (Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999) up to 3% (Amin and Kat, 2003; 
Amin and Kat, 2001; Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999; Capocci, 2001; and 
Liang, 2000). This clear distortion is caused by yearly hedge fund liquidation rates of up 
to 20% (Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999). However, as our sample includes both 
“life” and “dead” funds, we expect our benchmark and study samples not to be signifi-
cantly affected by this bias. But due to the criteria of eliminating all funds with 36 or 
less reported returns, there might be a mild bias. 
In addition, self-selection bias occurs when well performing and sufficiently capitalized 
funds decide to cease reporting returns to data providers (Ackermann, McEnally and 
Ravenscraft, 1999). The instant history or backfill bias can be observed when funds are 
allowed to report returns ex post (Fung and Hsieh, 2000). This allows the fund man-
agement to report only if they have performed successfully in the past. As the fund 
managers use data bases for marketing purposes there is an incentive to manipulate the 
reported returns (Capocci, 2001).  
Furthermore, the study sample could also be affected by the so called stale price bias 
which occurs when hedge funds trade non-liquid OTC-securities which cannot be priced 
precisely at any time. This leads to price distortions and as the change in asset value 
decisively influences fund returns, managers might have an incentive to take advantage 
of this effect (Asness, Krail and Liew, 2001; and Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin, 
2001).  
Finally, we would like to mention the liquidation bias which can be observed in the 
context of fund liquidations. When realizing that their fund will be liquidated (due to 
bad performance), managers might lose the incentive to report fund information to data 
bases (Fung and Hsieh, 2011). This might lead to an upward distortion of our results. 
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4.2 Exogenous factors 
For calculating the excess returns we use the risk-free interest rate provided by French 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). In addition, we 
also obtain market returns (MMRF), SMB, HML and Carhart’s momentum factor 
(MOM) from French’s website. All other exogenous factors (EMIO, HYI, CallO, PutO) 
were obtained from Datastream or computed by ourselves. 
We construct our option factors analogously to Agarwal and Naik (2004). We use Eu-
ropean call and put options on the S&P 500. We compute the option prices in-house, 
applying the pricing model of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). For com-
puting the prices of put and call options, we use the S&P 500 price index as well as its 
implicit volatilities, which are tracked by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX). For the risk-free rate we use the monthly US Treasury Bill rates. 
The earliest VIX time series only goes back to the first of January 1990. As we need the 
option price of the previous month to calculate a month’s return, the available infor-
mation does not allow calculating option returns for January 1990. Hence in all our ex-
aminations, we neglect the option factors for this month. 
(Insert Table 2 about here)  
5 Empirical results 
In the following we present and interpret the findings of our examinations. We focus on 
the different variations of the peer group benchmark, as it is our aim to examine to 
which extent the alternative peer group benchmarks can improve performance meas-
urement. 
5.1 Results using exogenous factors only 
Table 3 presents regression results from base model as well as various forms of em-
ployed peer group benchmarks (EB). The top panel gives the estimates of alpha and 
associated statistics and the bottom panel lists the estimated factor loadings and their 
statistics.  The results when using exogenous factors only are summarized in row one 
(“no EB”). Firstly, it is striking that the mean alpha for hedge funds is significantly 
positive when using the exogenous factors. This suggests that the hedge funds managers 
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outperformed the market on average by approximately 4% p.a. (0.267% p.m.) over the 
study period. Of the 7,559 hedge funds under consideration, 1,444 (19.103%) hedge 
funds significantly outperformed the market, whereas only 293 (3.876%) significantly 
underperformed the market (with a level of significance of 5%). The P-values for the 
exogenous factors differ from factor to factor and fund to fund. The mean P-value is the 
lowest for the market returns indicating that this is also the most important exogenous 
factor for hedge funds. However, for the base model “no EB”, the mean R2 is only 0.40 
which is relatively low. 
(Insert Table 3 about here)  
 
5.2 Results using equal-weighted peer group benchmarks 
Table 3 also summarizes the respective results when using the equally weighted two-
stage peer group benchmarks, respectively for the three alternative orthogonalization 
approaches in row 2 to 4.  
With the non-orthogonalized peer group benchmark (Option (2)) we obtain – as ex-
pected – different alphas for the single funds but one might have expected to get the 
group alpha of zero. However, in our study sample the group alpha with a value of -
0.024 which differs from zero. This is due to the different time frames the single funds 
had when constructing the fund dependent peer group benchmarks. Therefore this group 
alpha cannot be interpreted in the way that the hedge funds underperformed the market 
on average and is therefore unique to the study sample. However, the single alphas can 
be used to rank the individual funds relative to their intra-fund risks. We find that 900 
(11.906%) of the funds significantly outperformed their peer group whereas 802 
(10.609%) significantly underperformed their peer group. Due to the fact that we did 
not orthogonalize this peer group benchmark we get different loadings against the exog-
enous factors. The mean R2 increases to 0.56 (compared to the R2 of 0.4 previously), 
supporting the relevance of applying the concept of peer group benchmarks. The bottom 
panel of Table 3 provides the estimated mean coefficients for all risk factors include 
peer group benchmarks. We can see that as expected, when the peer group benchmarks 
are orthogonalized, there is no change in the mean estimates of factor loadings, but low-
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er P-value on average compared to the base model. Note that the mean P-values of most 
of the exogenous factors increase when the peer group benchmarks are not 
orthogonalized. This is because the implemented benchmark correlates with other risk 
factors to some degree.  
To retain the same factor loadings as in the case of not using peer group benchmark we 
use the orthogonalized peer group benchmark a+e (Option 3). By construction the fac-
tor loadings remain the same as in Option 1 whereas we get the same alphas and R2 as 
in the case where we did not orthogonalize the peer group benchmark (Option 2). 
Therefore the economic interpretation of these results with respect to the alphas is the 
same to those did not include any peer group benchmarks (Option 1). Note that the 
mean P-values of all of the exogenous factors now decrease and are even lower than in 
the case of not using any peer group benchmark. 
When using the orthogonalized peer group benchmark e (Option 4) we receive by con-
struction the same alphas and betas as in the case of not using any peer group bench-
mark (Option 1). The R2 is again 0.56, as a consequence of the methodology. However, 
the test statistics for the alphas change and consequently the number of funds signifi-
cantly out- and under-performing the market with respect to their peer group changes 
too. In total we find 1,820 funds (previously 1,444 funds) significantly outperforming 
and 534 funds (previously 293 funds) significantly underperforming the market with 
respect to their peer groups. The mean P-values are at the same low levels as for Option 
3. 
To briefly summarize the findings from Table 3, the adoption of peer group benchmark 
regardless in the form of Option 3 or Option 4 improves the estimation of the individual 
funds alpha. As suggested by Hunter et al. (2013), if the source of a fund’s performance 
comes from unique skills that are unrelated to co-movement, the alpha should be strong 
in both Options 3 and 4, this is not the case here. Among 1,444 top performing funds 
identified by factor model, only 900 of them stay top performing when group alpha is 
included in benchmark and there are also more poor performing funds of 802 compared 
with 293 in factor model. If the peer group benchmark does not include group alpha, 
that is, in Option 4, more funds are identified being out-performing, which is 1,820 
compare to 1,444 in factor model, this is because some funds either have highly corre-
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lated skills or load on a common missing risk factor. Overall depending on the aim of 
the performance analysis, the Options 3 (EB a+e) and Option 4 (EB e) deliver richer 
and more comprehensive performance information as compared to the Option 2 and 
Option 1, respectively. Even though Option 3 seem to provide same estimates of alphas 
as Option 2, by construction Option 2 is spurious. Therefore we limit our discussions to 
these Options 3 and 4 in our subsequent analyses.   
In Table 4 we summarize the mean alphas, test-statistics and R2 respectively for the dif-
ferent main- and sub-strategies when using the peer group benchmark a+e (Option 3) 
and the peer group benchmark e (Option 4). We also rank the performances of funds in 
our sample according to their main and sub-strategies under two options. The rankings 
are provided in the first two columns and the mean R squares of two options are provid-
ed in the last column, as previously stated, these two options provide same R squares.  
(Insert Table 4 about here)  
At the main strategy level, four out of five strategies have significant positive alphas 
between 0.16 and 0.67 under Option 4 (EB e) the most out-performing strategy is “Mac-
ro”. Interestingly, the “Fund of Funds” has no significant alpha. Similar to the results in 
Table 3, the mean alphas under Option 3, which is the “EB a+e” are a lot lower than 
Option 4 (EB e). With Option 4 (EB e), among five main categories, only “Fund of 
Funds” appears to be significant but negatively. This again suggests that the “Fund of 
Funds” is the worst performing strategy. Within each main strategy, the funds with sig-
nificant positive alphas are 218 (36%) for “Event Driven”, 673 (24%) for “Equity 
Hedge”, 635 (33%) for “Fund of Funds”, 404 (34%) for “Macro” and 424 (42%) for 
“Relative Value”. However, under Option 3 (EB a+e), all out-performing funds drop in 
both numbers and proportions. At the sub-strategy level, most of subgroups have signif-
icant positive mean alphas under Option 4 (EB e), however, most of them lose their sig-
nificance under Option 3 (EB a+e), except the “Multi-Strategy” in “Equity Hedge” and 
“Multi-Strategy” in “Relative Value” which appears to be negatively significant. 
As we get considerably deviating values for the estimated alphas from the 
orthogonalized peer group benchmark a+e (Option 3) and the orthogonalized peer 
group benchmark e (Option 4), we consider if the rankings of individual funds and addi-
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tionally groups of funds diverge, depending on the peer group benchmarks used. We 
started with calculating the rankings of the mean alphas of all funds within one main-
strategy one sub-strategy respectively (column “rank” in Table 4). We notice that at the 
main strategy level, rankings by Options 3 or 4 are similar. The strategy “Macro” comes 
first, the second is the “Event Driven”, than followed by the other three. However, at the 
sub-strategy level, there is a huge variation in rankings among most of the cases. Only 
four sub-strategies are ranked same or closely which are “Multi-Strategy”, ”Short Bias”, 
”Commodity-Multi” and “Currency-Systematic”.  Rankings of other sub-strategies are 
considerably different with respect to different ways of orthogonalizing the peer group 
benchmark. For instance, the sub-strategy Private Issue/Regulation D is ranked 1 of 37 
for the orthogonalized peer group benchmark e (Option 4), but when we apply the 
orthogonalized peer group benchmark a+e (Option 3), the same sub-strategy clearly 
underperforms (rank 36 of 37 sub-strategies).  
To further examine to what extent the rankings of single hedge funds depend on the 
applied orthogonalization method, we also rank the calculated alphas of all individual 
funds in our study sample for both the employed peer group benchmark Options 3 (EB 
a+e) and 4 (EB e). There are 7,559 funds in total. In both rankings the fund with the 
highest alpha is ranked 1st and the fund with the lowest alpha is ranked 7,559th. We ob-
serve considerable differences between the two rankings1. We find that the mean change 
of rankings is 1,098 with a standard deviation of 1,150. Hence, the peer group bench-
mark adopted exerts an influence on the relative performance evaluation of individual 
fund managers. The correlation of two types of rankings is only 0.73 which is consider-
ably low and suggests that rankings clearly change radically for the different peer group 
benchmarks Option 3 (EB a+e) versus Option 4 (EB e).  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients for models with Options 3 (EB a+e) and 4 
(EB e), as shown in Table 3, these two specifications provides same results for factor 
loadings. It can be seen that the factor loadings of the peer group benchmark 
ߚ௜,௠௔௜௡௦௧௥௔௧ and ߚ௜,௦௨௕௦௧௥௔௧ , shown by the last four columns are in most cases signifi-
cantly different from zero, which again highlights the importance of implementing the 
                                                 
1 For brevity of presentation, the results are not provided here. 
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peer group benchmarks. Among all other risk factors, the excess market return is still 
the most significant variable in explaining funds performance. It might be surprising 
that the mean factor loadings on the peer group benchmarks are not one. But this is 
again due to the different time-frames the individual funds existed. 
To verify our results using the equally-weighted group returns, we also repeat all tests 
using the value-weighted group returns as the peer group benchmarks. The results are 
presented in Table 6. 
As we can see that the results in Table 6 is comparable to Table 3. The results are basi-
cally similar from an economical point of view and therefore this suggests the robust-
ness of our approach.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Overall, our results confirm that implementing the group return as a peer group bench-
mark in the standard risk factor model improves the estimates of the funds’ alpha. Addi-
tionally implementing the orthogonalized peer group benchmark doesn’t change the 
estimates of factor loadings, but increase the explanatory power of the model. When the 
relative performance of funds considered, the rankings of individual funds deviate ac-
cording to the different specification of benchmarks. 
6 Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first adopting the concept of a two-stage 
peer group benchmark to measure the performance of hedge funds. The main purpose of 
using peer group benchmarks is to get an improved assessment of relative performance 
of hedge funds as the exogenous factors alone do not capture all the implicit commonal-
ities and explicit strategies of the various funds.  
Expanding the concept of peer group benchmarks from Hunter et al. (2013), where the 
performance of mutual funds was measured, we show that a two-stage peer group 
benchmark is a simple but effective way to avoid the “missing variable” and “common-
ality” problem when assessing individual hedge funds performances. Furthermore, we 
investigate different specification of peer group benchmark.  
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We find that on average, hedge funds in our data sample exhibit a significantly positive 
alpha of about 4% p.a. against the market wide or exogenous factors, however, imple-
menting the peer group benchmarks with group alpha could reduce this estimated values 
significantly. When using the non-orthogonalized peer group benchmark (Option 2) or 
the orthogonalized peer group benchmark including the benchmark-alpha (Option 3) the 
new alphas reflect the relative performance against the both exogenous factors as well 
as the peer groups of funds, which enable to identify the top/bottom performing funds 
relative to their group averages.  
We show that the rankings of single funds change significantly when employing the 
two-stage peer group benchmarks. Therefore investors and portfolio managers must not 
only consider the common but also the specific strategies into consideration when eval-
uating the performance of hedge funds and hedge fund managers. 
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Tables  
Table 1: Strategy allocation of hedge funds 
 
Table 2: Correlations of exogenous factors 
 
  
# share
⌀ obs. 
per fund # share
⌀ obs. 
per fund
Event Driven 600 7.94% 120.0 Macro 1,192 15.77% 116.6
Activist 22 0.29% 119.2 Active Trading 36 0.48% 109.3
Credit Arbitrage 22 0.29% 79.3 Commodity - Agriculture 19 0.25% 145.8
Distressed/Restructuring 178 2.35% 119.0 Commodity - Energy 4 0.05% 124.0
Merger Arbitrage 92 1.22% 131.0 Commodity - Metals 17 0.22% 75.4
Multi-Strategy 12 0.16% 172.6 Commodity - Multi 48 0.64% 111.5
Private Issue/Regulation 39 0.52% 81.7 Currency - Discretionary 17 0.22% 135.1
Special Situations 235 3.11% 119.1 Currency - Systematic 140 1.85% 118.1
Discretionary Thematic 252 3.33% 107.9
Equity Hedge 2,859 37.82% 108.8 Multi-Strategy 96 1.27% 105.6
Equity Market Neutral 353 4.67% 103.8 Systematic Diversified 563 7.45% 121.3
Fundamental Growth 697 9.22% 112.8
Fundamental Value 1,128 14.92% 111.6 Relative Value 1,003 13.27% 102.0
Multi-Strategy 54 0.71% 120.0 Fixed Income - Asset Backe 135 1.79% 105.4
Quantitative Directional 246 3.25% 101.5 Fixed Income - Convertible 179 2.37% 120.9
Sector - Energy/Basic Ma 101 1.34% 87.7 Fixed Income - Corporate 188 2.49% 91.5
Sector - Technology/HC 235 3.11% 97.5 Fixed Income - Sovereign 32 0.42% 100.8
Short Bias 45 0.60% 123.9 Multi-Strategy 338 4.47% 100.8
Volatility 73 0.97% 81.3
Fund of Funds 1,905 25.20% 113.6 Yield A. - Energy Infra. 29 0.38% 62.8
Conservative 425 5.62% 113.4 Yield A. - Real Estate 29 0.38% 93.0
Diversified 783 10.36% 116.1
Market Defensive 92 1.22% 135.7
Strategic 605 8.00% 106.3 Total 7,559 100% 111.4
This table gives an overview of the strategy allocations in the HFR -database and the number of monthly return 
observations for all funds included in the study sample.
HYI EMI Call Put MMRF SMB HML MOM
HYI 1.000
EMI 0.301 1.000
Call 0.303 0.511 1.000
Put -0.303 -0.616 -0.789 1.000
MMRF 0.296 0.713 0.806 -0.855 1.000
SMB 0.146 0.289 0.021 -0.127 0.198 1.000
HML -0.020 -0.212 -0.251 0.249 -0.269 -0.354 1.000
MOM -0.069 -0.226 -0.208 0.233 -0.281 -0.126 -0.046 1.000
This table reports the correlations between all exogenous factors for the total evaluation period from 01.01.1990 to 
31.02.2010.
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Table 3: Performance with equal-weighted peer group benchmarks 
 
 
 
  
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mean 
P-value P>|t | # posit ive
# neg-
ative ** # sig 
** # pos 
sig. ** # neg sig. 
** # pos not 
sig. 
** # neg not 
sig. 
Alpha
1. no EB ***0.267 0.920 -7.589 12.508 0.357 4,927 2,632 1,737 1,444 293 3,483 2,339
2. EB no orth. **-0.024 0.918 -12.259 12.423 0.358 3,764 3,795 1,702 900 802 2,864 2,993
3. EB a+e **-0.024 0.918 -12.259 12.423 0.358 3,764 3,795 1,702 900 802 2,864 2,993
4. EB e ***0.267 0.920 -7.589 12.508 0.307 4,927 2,632 2,354 1,820 534 3,107 2,098
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mean  P-
value P>|t | Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mean  P-
value P>|t | 
β-MMRF
1. no EB 0.335 0.448 -3.012 7.742 0.132 1. no EB 0.153 0.279 -2.261 2.734 0.307
2. EB no orth. -0.007 0.456 -12.470 4.345 0.319 2. EB no orth. -0.005 0.228 -4.291 2.616 0.424
3. EB a+e 0.335 0.448 -3.012 7.742 0.120 3. EB a+e 0.153 0.279 -2.261 2.734 0.273
4. EB e 0.335 0.448 -3.012 7.742 0.120 4. EB e 0.153 0.279 -2.261 2.734 0.273
β-HML
1. no EB 0.018 0.318 -4.931 2.594 0.341 1. no EB -0.001 0.030 -0.956 0.271 0.359
2. EB no orth. 0.011 0.286 -3.489 2.376 0.386 2. EB no orth. 0.000 0.024 -0.801 0.244 0.407
3. EB a+e 0.018 0.318 -4.931 2.594 0.297 3. EB a+e -0.001 0.030 -0.956 0.271 0.316
4. EB e 0.018 0.318 -4.931 2.594 0.297 4. EB e -0.001 0.030 -0.956 0.271 0.316
β-SMB
1. no EB 0.049 0.288 -3.256 3.233 0.411 1. no EB 0.002 0.018 -0.158 0.274 0.450
2. EB no orth. -0.004 0.298 -11.137 3.146 0.418 2. EB no orth. -0.001 0.016 -0.177 0.285 0.448
3. EB a+e 0.049 0.288 -3.256 3.233 0.356 3. EB a+e 0.002 0.018 -0.158 0.274 0.394
4. EB e 0.049 0.288 -3.256 3.233 0.356 4. EB e 0.002 0.018 -0.158 0.274 0.394
β-MOM
1. no EB 0.053 0.204 -2.833 2.552 0.307 1. no EB
2. EB no orth. -0.005 0.183 -3.517 1.650 0.368 2. EB no orth. 0.054 2.015 -23.627 23.639 0.340
3. EB a+e 0.053 0.204 -2.833 2.552 0.270 3. EB a+e 1.004 1.114 -17.618 23.922 0.136
4. EB e 0.053 0.204 -2.833 2.552 0.270 4. EB e 1.004 1.114 -17.618 23.922 0.136
β-HYI
1. no EB -0.069 0.928 -14.408 10.879 0.418 1. no EB
2. EB no orth. 0.013 0.824 -10.903 15.884 0.436 2. EB no orth. 0.955 2.005 -12.124 34.051 0.258
3. EB a+e -0.069 0.928 -14.408 10.879 0.371 3. EB a+e 0.955 2.005 -12.124 34.051 0.258
4. EB e -0.069 0.928 -14.408 10.879 0.371 4. EB e 0.955 2.005 -12.124 34.051 0.258
Number observations: 7,559 Mean R2: no EB 0.399 EB no orth. = EB a+e = EB e 0.563
β-EMIO
This table reports the mean alpha and the mean R2 of all hedge funds in the study sample as well as the mean estimated coefficients for all exogenous factors
and equally-weighted endogenous main- and substrategy benchmarks. For the alphas and the coefficients the standard deviation, the minimum and the
maximum values as well as the mean p-values are reported. In addition, this table reports the number of positive and negative alphas, the number of
significant alphas and further details about the algebraic signs of estimated signficant and non-significant alphas. The results are shown separately for four
different options: 1.) The use of no endogenous benchmark at all (no EB), 2.) the use of not orthogonalized endogenous benchmarks (EB no orth.), 3.) the
use of orthogonalized endogenous benchmarks which comprise the estimated intercepts a as well as the residuals e (EB a+e), 4.) the use of orthogonalized
endogenous benchmarks which only comprise the estimated residuals e (EB e). ***/** denote significance of being different from zero at the 1%/5% level. 
β-Substrat
β-Mainstrat
β-CallO
β-PutO
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Table 4: Regression alphas with equal-weighted peer group benchmarks for different strategies 
Obs.
EB e EB a+e EB e EB a+e
both 
Cases EB e EB a+e EB e EB a+e
EB e = EB 
a+e
Event Driven 2 2 ***0.374 0.041 0.276 0.344 600 439 264 218 174 0.535
Activist 31 4 0.033 0.117 0.332 0.351 22 11 10 5 8 0.616
Credit Arbitrage 26 32 0.171 -0.141 0.131 0.183 22 15 9 12 10 0.614
Distressed/Restructuring 21 24 ***0.268 -0.035 0.302 0.370 178 127 84 55 48 0.527
Merger Arbitrage 23 20 ***0.248 -0.027 0.278 0.318 92 70 36 37 34 0.509
Multi-Strategy 10 10 **0.526 0.033 0.117 0.415 12 10 4 7 4 0.509
Private Issue/Regulation D 1 36 ***1.170 -0.461 0.129 0.266 39 37 19 23 10 0.426
Special Situations 16 12 ***0.413 0.009 0.296 0.357 235 169 102 79 60 0.556
Equity Hedge 3 4 ***0.292 -0.032 0.343 0.386 2,859 1,903 1,486 673 487 0.532
Equity Market Neutral 25 15 ***0.185 -0.003 0.370 0.360 353 239 180 81 82 0.384
Fundamental Growth 20 29 ***0.291 -0.104 0.346 0.390 697 464 350 151 118 0.572
Fundamental Value 19 11 ***0.299 0.014 0.328 0.390 1,128 746 604 285 174 0.532
Multi-Strategy 14 3 ***0.479 **0.252 0.233 0.368 54 43 35 20 14 0.446
Quantitative Directional 22 34 ***0.259 -0.152 0.402 0.393 246 149 117 45 38 0.560
Sector - Energy/Basic Materials 27 35 0.162 -0.197 0.350 0.343 101 55 44 21 20 0.655
Sector - Technology/Healthcare 11 7 ***0.513 0.064 0.330 0.404 235 180 133 64 33 0.544
Short Bias 30 31 0.059 -0.125 0.336 0.426 45 27 23 6 8 0.676
Fund of Funds 5 3 0.004 ***-0.029 0.297 0.331 1,905 995 924 635 494 0.727
Conservative 35 22 0.010 -0.029 0.238 0.299 425 228 204 186 136 0.710
Diversified 33 17 **0.029 -0.017 0.290 0.323 783 421 381 258 213 0.734
Market Defensive 17 28 ***0.381 -0.091 0.217 0.357 92 75 42 48 23 0.625
Strategic 37 23 ***-0.091 -0.035 0.361 0.359 605 271 297 143 122 0.744
Macro 1 1 ***0.664 0.042 0.288 0.400 1,192 945 606 404 205 0.443
Active Trading 4 19 ***0.771 -0.018 0.245 0.489 36 33 25 14 7 0.394
Commodity - Agriculture 5 2 ***0.725 0.269 0.257 0.250 19 16 10 6 5 0.570
Commodity - Energy 6 37 0.619 -0.753 0.413 0.284 4 2 1 1 0 0.609
Commodity - Metals 12 27 0.492 -0.090 0.282 0.328 17 11 7 3 4 0.683
Commodity - Multi 2 1 ***0.952 0.446 0.250 0.379 48 41 28 15 6 0.474
Currency - Discretionary 9 26 ***0.532 -0.065 0.295 0.559 17 16 9 6 0 0.395
Currency - Systematic 15 16 ***0.456 -0.008 0.326 0.324 140 100 68 34 24 0.344
Discretionary Thematic 18 14 ***0.311 0.005 0.365 0.424 252 178 131 58 47 0.427
Multi-Strategy 8 5 ***0.583 0.098 0.298 0.402 96 75 49 34 17 0.417
Systematic Diversified 3 9 ***0.864 0.036 0.250 0.407 563 473 278 233 95 0.468
Relative Value 4 5 ***0.159 -0.056 0.265 0.289 1,003 645 484 424 342 0.498
Fixed Income - Asset Backed 13 6 ***0.487 0.074 0.211 0.206 135 106 81 76 76 0.369
Fixed Income - Convertible Arb. 29 13 0.076 0.006 0.227 0.284 179 111 87 93 56 0.607
Fixed Income - Corporate 36 33 -0.078 -0.142 0.317 0.336 188 93 82 64 52 0.523
Fixed Income - Sovereign 32 18 0.032 -0.017 0.239 0.240 32 20 18 13 14 0.487
Multi-Strategy 24 30 ***0.213 **-0.108 0.273 0.309 338 237 149 138 106 0.467
Volatility 34 25 0.013 -0.057 0.254 0.250 73 37 36 26 26 0.477
Yield Alternatives - Energy Infra. 7 21 **0.601 -0.028 0.389 0.290 29 21 14 8 7 0.661
Yield Alternatives - Real Estate 28 8 0.129 0.042 0.251 0.322 29 20 17 6 5 0.529
Num. Observations: 7,559 Mean R2 total: EB a+e = EB e 0.563
Left: EB e
Right: EB a+e
Rank Mean Alpha Mean P-Value P>|t |  # pos. Alphas ** # sig. Alphas Mean R2
This table reports the mean alpha and the mean R2 for all main- and sub-strategies in the HFR-database. The results are shown separately for the
two orthogonalization options EB a+e and EB e. For each strategy the mean p-values of the estimated alphas, the number of positive alphas as well
as the number of significant alphas are reported. The table additionally includes rankings which show the relative performance of individual
strategies in relation to the other strategies. There are separate rankings for main- and sub-strategies and for the two orthogonalization options
respectively.  ***/** denote significance of being different from zero at the 1%/5% level. 
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Table 5: Regression betas with equal-weighted peer group benchmarks for different strategies 
 
 
σ  Beta
Mainstrat
σ Beta 
Substrat
Event Driven 0.316 *** 0.071*** 0.111*** 0.011 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.118 *** 0.072 *** 1.021 0.828 1.026*** 1.806
Activist 0.747 *** 0.140 0.245*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.134 0.239 1.265 *** 1.047 1.216*** 1.499
Credit Arbitrage 0.239 *** -0.011 0.074 ** -0.036 -0.001 -0.013 ** -0.423 *** -0.020 0.974 *** 0.661 1.029*** 1.178
Distressed/Restructuring 0.293 *** 0.088*** 0.108*** 0.017 ** -0.002 ** -0.008*** -0.201 *** 0.050 1.221 *** 0.777 1.016*** 1.324
Merger Arbitrage 0.147 *** 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.032 0.033 *** 0.456 *** 0.345 0.953*** 0.429
Multi-Strategy 0.243 *** 0.044 0.019 -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 -0.289 0.128 1.048 *** 0.868 0.783 ** 1.039
Private Issue/Regulation D 0.187 *** 0.055 0.114 0.106 *** -0.007 ** -0.002 -0.387 *** 0.071 1.002 *** 0.977 1.327*** 1.623
Special Situations 0.391 *** 0.067*** 0.136*** -0.002 0.002 -0.003 ** -0.030 0.093 *** 1.074 *** 0.873 1.008*** 2.475
Equity Hedge 0.502 *** 0.015 ** 0.084*** 0.063 *** 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.126 *** 0.205 *** 1.033 *** 1.322 1.028*** 2.119
Equity Market Neutral 0.084 *** 0.065*** 0.024*** 0.064 *** 0.000 0.000 -0.025 0.036 *** 0.420 *** 0.668 0.890*** 1.437
Fundamental Growth 0.723 *** 0.008 0.055*** 0.082 *** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.234 *** 0.414 *** 1.406 *** 1.390 1.054*** 2.182
Fundamental Value 0.473 *** 0.063*** 0.100*** 0.037 *** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.080 *** 0.153 *** 0.925 *** 1.066 1.145*** 2.443
Multi-Strategy 0.392 *** 0.015 0.066 ** 0.016 0.004 -0.001 -0.099 0.190 *** 0.518 *** 0.854 0.297 1.354
Quantitative Directional 0.704 *** -0.017 0.237*** 0.070 *** 0.003 -0.006 -0.144 ** 0.120 *** 1.088 *** 2.029 0.977*** 2.572
Sector - Energy/Basic Materials 0.784 *** 0.068 0.159*** 0.123 *** 0.005 ** -0.013*** -0.473 *** 0.511 *** 2.119 *** 1.575 1.017*** 0.757
Sector - Technology/Healthcare 0.576 *** -0.269*** 0.071*** 0.123 *** 0.004*** -0.010*** -0.114 0.087 *** 1.213 *** 1.328 0.836*** 0.955
Short Bias -0.929 *** 0.075 -0.300*** -0.040 -0.008 ** -0.008 0.395 *** -0.018 -0.266 0.999 0.944*** 0.746
Fund of Funds 0.309 *** 0.003 0.028*** 0.074 *** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.160 *** 0.158 *** 1.012 *** 0.542 0.932*** 2.008
Conservative 0.190 *** 0.016 ** 0.011*** 0.023 *** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.209 *** 0.076 *** 0.816 *** 0.412 1.101*** 1.127
Diversified 0.294 *** 0.006 0.035*** 0.073 *** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.173 *** 0.144 *** 0.990 *** 0.455 0.897*** 2.212
Market Defensive -0.002 0.081*** -0.018 0.076 *** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.161 *** 0.114 *** 0.978 *** 0.590 1.006*** 0.855
Strategic 0.459 *** -0.022 ** 0.038*** 0.109 *** 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.156 *** 0.238 *** 1.182 *** 0.655 0.847*** 2.313
׎ Beta
CallO
׎ Beta
HYI
׎ Beta 
EMIO
׎ Beta 
Mainstrat
׎ Beta 
SubstratThe results for EB e and EB a+e are the same
׎ Beta
MMRF
׎ Beta
HML
׎ Beta
SMB
׎ Beta
MOM
׎ Beta
PutO
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Macro 0.091 *** 0.028*** -0.010 0.075 *** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.246 *** 0.144 *** 0.894 *** 1.228 0.889*** 1.690
Active Trading -0.005 -0.093 -0.073 -0.019 0.002 -0.015 0.202 0.083 *** -0.378 3.051 1.282 5.636
Commodity - Agriculture 0.240 *** 0.044 0.032 0.192 *** 0.007 ** -0.003 0.166 0.158 *** 1.164 *** 1.329 1.105*** 0.975
Commodity - Energy 0.407 0.129 -0.036 0.229 0.004 -0.023 -0.276 0.498 1.335 0.840 0.822 ** 0.486
Commodity - Metals 0.531 ** 0.138 0.010 0.132 ** 0.018 -0.016 -0.556 0.907 *** 1.491 *** 1.665 0.875*** 0.533
Commodity - Multi 0.097 ** 0.106 ** -0.116 ** 0.113 *** 0.011*** 0.008 -0.046 0.118 1.189 *** 1.204 1.036*** 0.945
Currency - Discretionary 0.018 0.031 0.070 -0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.064 0.063 0.268 *** 0.332 1.092 ** 1.962
Currency - Systematic -0.016 0.016 0.007 0.048 ** 0.002 0.010*** 0.179 ** 0.022 0.565 *** 0.840 0.872*** 1.057
Discretionary Thematic 0.303 *** 0.078*** 0.036 0.039 ** 0.005*** 0.004 ** 0.132 0.226 *** 0.431 *** 0.721 0.938*** 1.211
Multi-Strategy 0.204 *** 0.009 0.010 0.053 *** 0.004*** 0.006 ** 0.097 0.183 *** 0.621 *** 0.692 0.473*** 1.045
Systematic Diversified -0.010 0.008 -0.030 ** 0.099 *** 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.406 *** 0.114 *** 1.275 *** 1.203 0.893*** 1.640
Relative Value 0.208 *** 0.009 0.026*** -0.017 *** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.081 *** 0.057 *** 1.028 *** 1.261 0.827*** 2.111
Fixed Income - Asset Backed 0.054 *** 0.061*** 0.016 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005*** 0.028 0.000 0.521 *** 0.970 0.815*** 1.167
Fixed Income - Convertible Arb. 0.227 *** -0.003 0.039*** -0.032 *** -0.001 ** -0.008*** -0.005 0.092 *** 1.602 *** 1.072 0.922*** 0.825
Fixed Income - Corporate 0.244 *** 0.063 ** 0.001 -0.024 ** -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.217 *** 0.000 1.176 *** 1.308 1.324*** 3.388
Fixed Income - Sovereign 0.158 *** -0.043 -0.039 -0.009 -0.002 -0.014*** 0.113 0.077 *** 0.583 *** 1.040 0.846*** 0.902
Multi-Strategy 0.203 *** 0.012 0.039 ** -0.031 ** -0.002 ** -0.008*** -0.061 0.082 *** 1.046 *** 1.066 0.429*** 2.182
Volatility 0.232 *** -0.150 ** 0.020 0.065 -0.016 *** -0.040*** -0.169 0.080 ** 0.295 1.937 1.176*** 1.860
Yield Alternatives - Energy Infra. 0.559 *** -0.277*** 0.025 -0.001 -0.004 ** -0.011 ** -0.526 *** 0.090 ** 1.697 *** 1.500 0.790*** 0.676
Yield Alternatives - Real Estate 0.292 *** 0.182*** 0.085 ** -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.039 0.052 0.341 0.915 0.848*** 0.658
This table reports the coefficients for all exogenous factors and for the endogenous main- and sub-strategy benchmarks for the two orthogonalization options EB a+e and EB e. The results are
reported separately for all main- and sub-strategies in the HFR-database. The table additonally reports the standard deviatons of the endogenous benchmark coefficients. ***/** denote
significance of being different from zero at the 1%/5% level. 
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Table 6: Performance with value-weighted peer group benchmarks 
 
 
 
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mean  P-
value P>|t | # posit ive
# neg-
ative ** # sig 
** # pos 
sig. 
** # neg 
sig. 
** # pos 
not sig. 
** # neg 
not sig. 
Alpha
1. no EB ***0.267 0.920 -7.589 12.508 0.357 4,927 2,632 1,737 1,444 293 3,483 2,339
2. EB no orth. **0.025 0.891 -9.200 12.499 0.361 3,798 3,761 1,669 934 735 2,864 3,026
3. EB a+e **0.025 0.891 -9.200 12.499 0.361 3,798 3,761 1,669 934 735 2,864 3,026
4. EB e ***0.267 0.920 -7.589 12.508 0.312 4,927 2,632 2,295 1,782 513 3,145 2,119
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mean  P-
value P>|t | Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mean  P-
value P>|t | 
β-MMRF
1. no EB 0.335 0.448 -3.012 7.742 0.132 1. no EB 0.153 0.279 -2.261 2.734 0.307
2. EB no orth. 0.078 0.437 -11.285 5.234 0.296 2. EB no orth. 0.018 0.236 -4.760 3.648 0.417
3. EB a+e 0.335 0.448 -3.012 7.742 0.121 3. EB a+e 0.153 0.279 -2.261 2.734 0.277
4. EB e 0.335 0.448 -3.012 7.742 0.121 4. EB e 0.153 0.279 -2.261 2.734 0.277
β-HML
1. no EB 0.018 0.318 -4.931 2.594 0.341 1. no EB -0.001 0.030 -0.956 0.271 0.359
2. EB no orth. 0.017 0.303 -6.753 2.068 0.368 2. EB no orth. -0.002 0.027 -1.098 0.210 0.408
3. EB a+e 0.018 0.318 -4.931 2.594 0.301 3. EB a+e -0.001 0.030 -0.956 0.271 0.320
4. EB e 0.018 0.318 -4.931 2.594 0.301 4. EB e -0.001 0.030 -0.956 0.271 0.320
β-SMB
1. no EB 0.049 0.288 -3.256 3.233 0.411 1. no EB 0.002 0.018 -0.158 0.274 0.450
2. EB no orth. 0.028 0.279 -5.860 3.213 0.411 2. EB no orth. -0.001 0.016 -0.162 0.285 0.443
3. EB a+e 0.049 0.288 -3.256 3.233 0.360 3. EB a+e 0.002 0.018 -0.158 0.274 0.399
4. EB e 0.049 0.288 -3.256 3.233 0.360 4. EB e 0.002 0.018 -0.158 0.274 0.399
β-MOM
1. no EB 0.053 0.204 -2.833 2.552 0.307 1. no EB
2. EB no orth. -0.013 0.195 -5.825 1.907 0.377 2. EB no orth. 0.357 1.744 -21.145 26.691 0.335
3. EB a+e 0.053 0.204 -2.833 2.552 0.274 3. EB a+e 0.831 0.995 -19.853 15.101 0.149
4. EB e 0.053 0.204 -2.833 2.552 0.274 4. EB e 0.831 0.995 -19.853 15.101 0.149
β-HYI
1. no EB -0.069 0.928 -14.408 10.879 0.418 1. no EB
2. EB no orth. 0.002 0.854 -11.542 14.956 0.438 2. EB no orth. 0.491 1.539 -18.247 19.724 0.279
3. EB a+e -0.069 0.928 -14.408 10.879 0.376 3. EB a+e 0.491 1.539 -18.247 19.724 0.279
4. EB e -0.069 0.928 -14.408 10.879 0.376 4. EB e 0.491 1.539 -18.247 19.724 0.279
Number observations: 7,559Mean R2: no EB 0.399 EB no orth. = EB a+e = EB e 0.548
β-EMIO
This table reports the mean alpha and the mean R2 of all hedge funds in the study sample as well as the mean estimated coefficients for all exogenous
factors and value-weighted endogenous main- and substrategy benchmarks. For the alphas and the coefficients the standard deviation, the minimum
and the maximum values as well as the mean p-values are reported. In addition, this table reports the number of positive and negative alphas, the
number of significant alphas and further detail about the algebraic signs of estimated signficant and non-significant alphas. The results are shown
separately for four different options: 1.) The use of no endogenous benchmark at all (no EB), 2.) the use of not orthogonalized endogenous
benchmarks (EB no orth.), 3.) the use of orthogonalized endogenous benchmarks which comprise the estimated intercepts a as well as the residuals e
(EB a+e), 4.) the use of orthogonalized endogenous benchmarks which only comprise the estimated residuals e (EB e). ***/** denote significance of
being different from zero at the 1%/5% level. 
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